Self-Sufficiently Knowable and Imputedly Knowable Objects

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Introduction

To gain liberation or enlightenment requires non-conceptual cognition that persons, for instance “me,” lack an impossible soul (gang-zag-gi bdag-med, the selflessness of persons, the identitylessness of persons). In the Gelug presentation, except for the Vaibhashika (Skt. Vaibhāṣika) tenet system, all other Indian Buddhist tenet systems assert that one of the specific impossible souls that persons lack is one that has self-sufficiently knowable substantial existence. Vaibhashika asserts that persons do have self-sufficiently knowable substantial existence.  

[For the Vaibhashika division between self-sufficiently knowable substantially existent phenomena and imputedly knowable phenomena, see: The Two Truths: Vaibhashika and Sautrantika (Skt. Sautrāntika)]

The Sautrantika, Chittamatra (Skt. Cittamātra) and Svatantrika (Skt. Svātantrika) tenet systems assert the lack or absence of such an impossible soul as the lack of a subtle impossible soul of persons (gang-zag-gi bdag-med phra-mo, subtle selflessness of persons), while Prasangika (Skt. Prāsaṅgika) asserts it as the lack of a coarse impossible soul of persons (gang-zag-gi bdag-med rags-pa, coarse selflessness of persons).

Valid cognition (tshad-ma) of this selflessness requires correct and decisive identification of the validly knowable “me” – the mere “I” (nga-tsam) – and distinguishing it from the impossible soul of a person. Here, the property that distinguishes the two is the manner in which the validly knowable “me” could be validly known. The variables do not specifically concern whether the valid cognition is conceptual or non-conceptual. It concerns whether the validly knowable “me” has self-sufficiently knowable substantial existence or imputably knowable existence (btags-yod, Skt. prajnaptisat; imputed existence).

All non-Prasangika Indian Buddhist tenet systems assert that validly knowable phenomena must be either one or the other. Prasangika asserts that all validly knowable phenomena have imputedly knowable existence. Nothing has self-sufficiently knowable existence.

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